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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Justin Keith Austin appeals from the withheld judgment entered upon the 
jury verdict finding him guilty of felony driving under the influence (DUI).  On 
appeal, Austin claims the district court abused its discretion when it ruled that 
Austin’s proposed expert testimony that would have extrapolated Austin’s BAC 
test results back to the time Austin was driving was inadmissible under a “per se” 
theory of DUI.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
At around 12:25 a.m. Austin pulled his Jeep Cherokee out of a Maverick 
gas station and crossed multiple traffic lanes without using his turn signal.  
(3/14/16 Tr., p. 37, L. 4 – p. 40, L. 6.)  Deputy Richardson pulled Austin over for 
failing to use his signal.  (Id.)  When Deputy Richardson made contact with 
Austin he immediately smelled an odor of alcohol.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 41, Ls. 4-19.)  
Austin’s eyes were “a little bloodshot and glassy” and his speech was “a little bit” 
slow.  (Id.)  Austin admitted he had “one shot of alcohol.”  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 42, Ls. 
9-19.)  Austin failed field sobriety tests.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 45, L. 7 – p. 69, L. 22; 
R., pp. 16-18.)  Austin admitted to Deputy Richardson that he knew he did not do 
well on the field sobriety tests.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 69, Ls. 10-22.)  Deputy 
Richardson arrested Austin for DUI.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 69, L. 23 – p. 70, L. 14.)   
Austin consented to a breath test.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 76, Ls. 12-22, p. 87, L. 
24 – p. 93, L. 2; Ex. 3.)  The breathalyzer, a LifeLoc FC20, was functioning 
properly.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 76, L. 18 – p. 87, L. 9.)  The breath test showed results 
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of .085/.086.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 97, L. 16 – p. 98, L. 19; R., p. 17.)  Austin had two 
previous DUI convictions within ten years, so the state charged Austin with felony 
DUI.  (R., pp. 40-41.)   
Prior to trial, Austin disclosed that he intended to call Loring Beals, a 
clinical toxicologist, to testify as an expert witness.  (R., pp. 98-99.)  The state 
filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence “relating to any measurement of 
uncertainty or margin of error of the Lifeloc FC20 breath testing instrument” and 
evidence “relating to the Defendant’s alcohol concentration (BAC) at the time he 
was driving or stopped, and further excluding any testimony [,] other evidence, 
argument or comment relating to whether Defendant’s BAC was rising between 
the time he was driving or stopped and the time of the breath tests.”  (R., pp. 
108-109, 112-118.)1  Austin objected.  (R., pp. 119-125.)  The district court held 
a hearing on the state’s motion.  (R., p. 126.)   
The district court ruled that expert testimony regarding extrapolating blood 
alcohol content was irrelevant under the “per se” theory of DUI, but it could be 
relevant to an “impairment” theory if the testimony went to the effect blood 
alcohol level had on the defendant’s impairment.  (R., pp. 128-129; 3/14/16, Tr., 
p. 10, L. 13 – p. 11, L. 6.) 
THE COURT:  Here’s what I’m thinking.  Under the per se theory I 
agree with you that extrapolation of the results of the alcohol 
concentration test back to the time when the defendant was driving 
or in actual physical control is irrelevant under the statute.  
However, under an impairment theory, looking at the Robinett case, 
not only is it relevant, it’s required for the Court – for the jury to 
                                            
1 Evidence relating to determining whether Austin’s BAC was rising between the 
time he was driving and the time of the breath test is sometimes referred to as 
“extrapolation” evidence.   
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consider an alcohol concentration test that was taken at a time 
other than when the defendant was driving or in actual physical 
control.  
 
 Not only that, but there has to be testimony as to what, if 
any, effect it has on the defendant’s impairment, if any.  I think 
that’s the clear holding of Robinett, which is still the law on the 
impairment theory.  I know it doesn’t make much sense, but then I 
didn’t write the decisions either.  
 
(3/14/16, Tr., p. 10, L. 13 – p. 11, L. 6.) 
 
Defense counsel clarified that Austin was seeking to introduce expert 
testimony only regarding the “per se” theory of DUI.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 25, L. 24 – 
p. 27, L. 3.)  Specifically, Austin’s expert, based upon information provided by 
Austin, would testify that Austin’s BAC would have been approximately .06 at the 
time he was driving.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 1-20.)  The district court determined 
it was bound by controlling Idaho case law and rejected Austin’s argument.  
(3/14/16 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 4-12.)   
THE COURT:  Conceptually I’ll agree with you, but – and if I had a 
blank tablet that I was operating under, I would say, you know, 
you’re right.  But the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have 
ruled on the issue.  Admittedly I don’t think they ever discussed the 
due process – due process concept.  But if I understand the series 
of cases, that type of testimony comes in under an impairment 
theory, but not under a per se theory.   
 
(3/14/16 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 4-12.)  Austin then conferred with his expert to make a 
decision whether the defense would still call the expert to testify regarding 
impairment.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 7-13.)  At the start of the second day of trial, 
Austin informed the court that he decided not to call his expert.  (3/15/16 Tr., p. 
144, Ls. 18-19.)   
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At trial, the state argued both the “per se” theory and the impairment 
theory.  (3/15/16 Add. Tr., p. 207, L. 6 – p. 208, L. 5.2)  The state’s expert, Gary 
Dawson, reviewed the police reports and the police video, including the recording 
of the field sobriety tests, and testified Austin was “impaired beyond the ability to 
safely operate a motor vehicle.”  (3/15/16 Tr., p. 268, L. 25 – p. 271, L. 21.)   
The jury found Austin guilty of DUI and the district court found that he had 
twice been convicted of substantially conforming DUIs.  (R., pp. 156-157.)  The 
district court withheld judgment and placed Austin on probation for seven years.  
(R., pp. 161-163.)  Austin timely appealed.  (R., pp. 169-171.)  
                                            
2 The October 14, 2015 Motion to Suppress hearing, the March 9, 2016 Pretrial 
Conference, and portions of the March 14 and 15 Jury Trial are transcribed in a 
separate volume, labeled “Additional Transcript.”  When the Additional Transcript 





Austin states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the 
State’s motion in limine because it did not apply the relevant 
precedent correctly and violated Mr. Austin’s due process 
right to present a complete defense?  
 
2. Does the dicta in Tomlinson render Idaho Code § 18-8004 
overbroad and void for vagueness as applied?   
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
 1. Has Austin failed to show the district court abused its discretion 
when it properly applied prior precedent and excluded Austin’s irrelevant 
“extrapolation” evidence?   
 
 2. Has Austin failed to establish that it was fundamental error for the 
district court not to sua sponte rule that Idaho Code § 18-8004 was 






The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Ruled That Austin’s 
Proposed Extrapolation Evidence Was Inadmissible 
 
A. Introduction 
 Austin proposed to introduce expert testimony that his blood alcohol 
concentration was rising from the time he was driving to the time he took the 
breathalyzer test.  (See 3/14/16 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 1-20.)  The state moved to 
exclude this evidence.  (R., pp. 108-109, 112-118.)  The district court applied 
prior precedent and ruled that Austin’s proposed extrapolation evidence was 
inadmissible as to the “per se” theory of DUI.  (See R., pp. 128-132; 3/14/16, p. 
10, L. 13 – p. 11, L. 6, p. 27, Ls. 4-12.)  On appeal, Austin claims that the district 
court abused its discretion because the prior precedent, specifically, State v. 
Tomlinson, 159 Idaho 112, 357 P.3d 238 (Ct. App. 2015) (review denied Oct. 14, 
2015), was either wrongly decided or contained dicta on which the district court 
relied, and that the exclusion of his proposed extrapolation evidence violated his 
right to present a defense.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-24.)  Austin’s appellate 
arguments fail.  The applicable holding in Tomlinson was properly based upon 
prior precedent and the plain language of I.C. § 18-8004, and Austin’s right to 
present a defense was not infringed.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The decision to allow or exclude expert testimony is within the discretion 
of the trial court and will not be set aside absent a showing of abuse of 
discretion.”  State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853, 26 P.3d 31, 36 (2001) (citing 
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State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 875, 908 P.2d 566, 568 (1995); State v. Crea, 
119 Idaho 352, 353, 806 P.2d 445, 446 (1991)).  
In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of discretion, the appellate court 
must determine whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one 
involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific 
choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  Id. (citing 
State v. Powell, 125 Idaho 889, 891, 876 P.2d 587, 589 (1994); State v. Hedger, 
115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). 
 
C. Austin Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it applied Idaho 
precedent and granted the state’s motion to preclude Austin from introducing 
extrapolation evidence in an attempt to show that his BAC was lower when he 
was driving than when he took the breath test.  (See 3/14/16 Tr., p. 10, L. 13 – p. 
11, L. 6, p. 27, Ls. 4-12.)  On appeal, Austin argues that he “had a right to 
present scientific evidence that his alcohol concentration, when he was driving, 
was not over the legal limit.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)  Austin’s argument is not 
supported by Idaho law because, under the “per se” theory of DUI, the relevant 
BAC is Austin’s BAC when he took the breath test, not when he was driving.   
Idaho Code 18-8004(1)(a) provides: 
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of 
alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating substances, or who has 
an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of 
this section, or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or 
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breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon 
public or private property open to the public.  
 
Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a). 
 
 The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted the foregoing language “as 
establishing one crime with two ways of proving a violation.”  State v. Robinett, 
141 Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005) (citations omitted).  “[T]he first 
way to prove a violation is to show under the totality of the evidence that the 
defendant was driving under the influence.”  Id.  “The second way to prove a 
violation is to establish the defendant drove with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 
percent or more.”  Id.  The second method is commonly referred to as the “per 
se” theory.  See, e.g., State v. Juarez, 155 Idaho 449, 452, 313 P.3d 777, 780 
(Ct. App. 2013) (“In regard to a per se violation under section 18–8004(1)(a), the 
criminal act is having an ‘alcohol concentration of 0.08 ... or more, as shown by 
analysis of his blood, urine, or breath.’”).  “The State may elect to proceed 
against the defendant under either or both theories of proof.”  Robinett, 141 
Idaho at 112, 106 P.3d at 438.  Further, “[e]vidence that is relevant under one 
theory of proof is not necessarily relevant under the other.”  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
In State v. Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho 200, 202-203, 280 P.3d 703, 705-706 
(2012), the Idaho Supreme Court considered a claim that a hearing officer in an 
administrative license suspension case violated the defendant’s due process 
rights “by failing to take into account the margin of error of the Lifeloc FC20.”  In 
addressing this issue, the Court recited its prior holding in Robinett, which was 
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based on the 1984 version of I.C. § 18-8004, that where the state “seek[s] to 
establish a per se violation (the defendant’s BAC exceeded the statutory limit), 
then it [is] not necessary to extrapolate the test results back to the time the 
defendant was driving.”  Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203, 280 P.3d at 706 (citing 
Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 106 P.3d 436).  The Court then reviewed the 1987 
amendment to I.C. § 18-8004, which eliminated the need for a “determination of 
alcohol concentration in the blood to prove a per se violation,” and instead 
allowed the state to establish such a violation “simply by the test results.”  Id. at 
204, 280 P.3d at 707.  Thus, the Court observed, “[a]fter the 1987 amendment, a 
violation can be shown simply by the results of a test for alcohol concentration 
that complies with the statutory requirements.  With that change, the margin of 
error in the testing equipment is irrelevant.”  Id.     
 Specifically addressing the legislature’s authority to define crimes, the 
Court further stated: 
The legislature has the authority to make driving a motor vehicle 
with any alcohol in one’s system a crime and/or a ground for 
suspension of one’s driver’s license.  When the statute declared it 
a crime for a person to drive a motor vehicle with “alcohol in his 
blood” greater than a specified amount, we did not require the 
State to establish the precise amount of alcohol in the driver’s 
blood at the time of driving, even though we knew that the alcohol 
concentration in the driver’s blood at the time of the driving could 
be lower than at the time of testing.  In essence, we held that the 
driver took the risk that the concentration of alcohol in his blood at 
the time of testing would be greater than it was when he was 
actually driving an hour earlier.  After the 1987 amendments, the 
standard is no longer the concentration of alcohol in the driver’s 
blood.  It is simply the alcohol concentration shown by an approved 
and properly administered test of the driver’s breath, blood, or 
urine.  Because the actual alcohol concentration in the driver’s 
blood is no longer the standard, the testing machine’s margin of 
error is irrelevant.   
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Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205-206, 280 P.3d at 708-709.  
  
 The Court in Elias-Cruz made clear that the margin of error of a breath-
testing machine is irrelevant.  Id.  The Court also made clear in Elias-Cruz, and 
cases preceding it, that the relevant question under a “per se” theory of driving 
under the influence is the BAC at the time of the test, not when the defendant 
was driving.  Id. 
 In Tomlinson, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals applied the holding in 
Elias-Cruz, and held that the relevant question under a “per se” theory of DUI is 
the BAC at the time of the test.  See Tomlinson, 159 Idaho at 121-122, 357 P.3d 
at 247-248.  Tomlinson was arrested for DUI and he provided two breath 
samples which returned BAC results of .083 and .082.  Id. at 115, 357 P.3d at 
241.  The state proceeded solely on the “per se” theory of DUI.  Id.  Prior to trial, 
the state filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude, among other things, 
evidence “whether Tomlinson’s blood alcohol concentration has ascended or 
descended from the time he was stopped to the time he provided the breath 
sample.”  Id.  The magistrate precluded Tomlinson from introducing evidence 
regarding his blood alcohol level at the time he was driving.  Id. at 116, 357 P.3d 
at 242.  The jury found Tomlinson guilty of DUI and Tomlinson appealed to the 
district court.  Id.  The district court affirmed.  Id.   
On appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals, Tomlinson argued, among other 
things, that the magistrate erred by excluding evidence “whether Tomlinson’s 
blood alcohol concentration was ascending between the time he was stopped 
and when the breath test was given.”  Id. at 119, 357 P.3d at 245.  As noted by 
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the Idaho Court of Appeals, under the “per se” theory of liability the state was 
required to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt, that Tomlinson had an alcohol 
concentration of .08 or above at the time the test was taken.”  Id. at 120, 357 
P.3d at 246 (citing Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112, 106 P.3d at 438; State v. Sutliff, 
97 Idaho 523, 524, 547 P.2d 1128, 1129 (1976); Juarez, 155 Idaho at 452, 313 
P.3d at 780)). “Indeed, such proof is conclusive, not presumptive, of guilt.”  Id. 
(citing State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 135, 867 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Ct. App. 
1994); State v. Andrus, 118 Idaho 711, 713, 800 P.2d 107, 109 (Ct. App. 1990)).  
The only question, under a “per se” theory of liability, is the alcohol concentration 
in the defendant’s blood, breath or urine at the time the sample was taken.  Id.  
“[T]he alcohol concentration in a defendant’s blood, breath, or urine at the time 
he or she was driving is irrelevant.”  Id. at 122, 357 P.3d at 248.  The Court of 
Appeals concluded that the district court did not err in affirming the magistrate’s 
decision to exclude evidence whether Tomlinson’s blood alcohol concentration 
was ascending between the time he was stopped and when the breath test was 
given.  Id.   
 Here, the district court properly applied the correct legal standards and 
determined that Austin’s proposed extrapolation evidence was not admissible 
under the “per se” theory of DUI.  (See 3/14/16 Tr., p. 10, L. 13 – p. 11, L. 6, p. 
27, Ls. 4-12.)  On appeal, Austin argues the district court abused its discretion 
because Elias-Cruz involved the margin of error on the breath testing machinery 
and the Court of Appeals’ discussion of expert testimony in Tomlinson was 
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“dicta.”  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-20.)  Alternatively, Austin argues 
Tomlinson should be overruled or “narrowed to its facts.”  (See id.)   
Austin’s “dicta” argument is misplaced.  The applicable holding of 
Tomlinson is broader than the discussion of a potential expert witness.  The 
Court in Tomlinson stated that blood alcohol extrapolation evidence is irrelevant 
to a “per se” theory of DUI and the trial court properly excluded this evidence at 
trial.  This statement is the holding, not dicta, because it was necessary to decide 
the issue on appeal.  “If the statement is not necessary to decide the issue 
presented to the appellate court, it is considered to be dictum and not 
controlling.”  State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74, 305 P.3d 513, 518 (2013) 
(citing Petersen v. State, 87 Idaho 361, 365, 393 P.2d 585, 587 (1964)).  “Dicta 
are opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of 
the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point, are not 
the professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself.”  Smith v. Angell, 
122 Idaho 25, 34–35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1172–1173 (1992) (J. Bistline, dissenting) 
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 454 (6th ed. 1990)). 
Dictum. A statement, remark, or observation.  Gratis dictum; a 
gratuitous or voluntary representation; one which a party is not 
bound to make. Simplex dictum; a mere assertion; an assertion 
without proof. 
 
The word is generally used as an abbreviated form of obiter dictum, 
‘a remark by the way;’ that is, an observation or remark made by a 
judge in pronouncing an opinion upon a cause, concerning some 
rule, principle, or application of law, or the solution of a question 
suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily involved in the 
case or essential to its determination; any statement of the law 
enunciated by the court merely by way of illustration, argument, 
analogy, or suggestion. Statements and comments in an opinion 
concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily 
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involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand or obiter 
dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 98 
Colo. 568, 58 P.2d 1223, 1226 [1936]. Dicta are opinions of a 
judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the 
court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the 





In Tomlinson, the issue whether extrapolation evidence was properly 
excluded from trial was specifically raised and argued on appeal.  See 
Tomlinson, 159 Idaho at 119, 357 P.3d at 245.   
Tomlinson also contends that the district court erred in affirming 
various evidentiary rulings by the magistrate. Specifically, 
Tomlinson argues that the magistrate erred in excluding evidence 
regarding … whether Tomlinson’s blood alcohol concentration was 
ascending between the time he was stopped and when the breath 
test was given[.]  
 
Id.  Tomlinson analyzed the applicable statute, I.C. 18-8004, and the applicable 
case law, including Elias-Cruz, Robinett, State v. Hardesty, 136 Idaho 707, 39 
P.3d 647 (Ct. App. 2002), and State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 804 P.2d 936 
(Ct. App.1991).  See Tomlinson, 159 Idaho at 119-122, 357 P.3d at 245-248.  
Based upon this law the Court of Appeals held: 
No Idaho appellate court has ever held, under the post–1987 DUI 
statute, that evidence regarding a defendant’s alcohol 
concentration at a time other than when an evidentiary test was 
performed is relevant under a per se theory of liability. Thus, the 
alcohol concentration in a defendant’s blood, breath, or urine at the 
time he or she was driving is irrelevant. The district court did not err 
in affirming the magistrate’s decision to exclude such evidence as 
irrelevant. 
 
Id. at 119-122, 357 P.3d at 245-248.  This holding directly addressed the issue 
raised on appeal regarding the admissibility of evidence that Tomlinson’s blood 
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alcohol concentration was ascending after he was stopped.  This holding is not 
dicta.   
Austin’s argument that Tomlinson should be overruled or “narrowed to its 
facts” is similarly misplaced.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-20.)  A prior opinion 
will not be overruled unless it shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the 
holding has proven, over time, to be unwise or unjust.  See State v. Koivu, 152 
Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (citations omitted) (the Court “will 
ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior opinions unless it is shown to have been 
manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has proven over time to be unwise 
or unjust”); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) 
(“[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong 
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise.”).  Austin argues that Tomlinson 
misapplied prior case law.  (See id.)  Austin argues:  
It is true that the cases Tomlinson relied on stand for the 
proposition that the State is not required to extrapolate back to 
have test results admitted.  But they most certainly do not stand for 
the proposition that a defendant is not allowed to present 
extrapolation evidence in order to defend himself.  One does not 
follow from the other.  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 16 (emphasis in original).)  This argument to overrule prior 
precedent fails. 
Idaho Code Section § 18-8004 provides the mechanisms for establishing 
a defendant is guilty of driving under the influence.  One mechanism is to show 
that the defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of .08, or higher, as 
established by a test conducted pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), and that the 
defendant drove, or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.  I.C. § 18-
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8004(1)(a).  The statute does not say that the defendant’s BAC must be .08 or 
above “while” driving.  Case law makes clear that the defendant’s “actual” alcohol 
concentration is irrelevant.  See State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 375 P.3d 279 
(2016).   
However, as we explained in Elias–Cruz, the actual alcohol 
concentration is irrelevant.  Rather, it is the alcohol concentration 
as shown by the test result that is determinative of a violation.  
 
Id. at 452, 375 P.3d at 282 (citing Elias–Cruz, 153 Idaho at 204-205, 280 P.3d at 
707–708).  As the Idaho Supreme Court explained, it is within the power of the 
legislature to define crimes and place conditions on the right to drive and that 
can include not requiring evidence of the exact amount of alcohol in the 
defendant’s blood:   
There is no constitutional right to drive with alcohol in one’s system. 
The legislature has the authority to define crimes, State v. Prather, 
135 Idaho 770, 775, 25 P.3d 83, 88 (2001), and to place conditions 
upon the right to drive a motor vehicle, State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 
166, 171, 125 P.3d 522, 527 (2005) (suspending a driver’s license 
for underage drinking), and Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 
99, 104, 416 P.2d 46, 51 (1966) (suspending a driver’s license for 
failure to deposit security for payment of judgment). The legislature 
has the authority to make driving a motor vehicle with any alcohol 
in one’s system a crime and/or a ground for suspension of one’s 
driver’s license. When the statute declared it a crime for a person 
to drive a motor vehicle with “alcohol in his blood” greater than a 
specified amount, we did not require the State to establish the 
precise amount of alcohol in the driver’s blood at the time of 
driving, even though we knew that the alcohol concentration in the 
driver’s blood at the time of driving could be lower than at the time 
of testing. 
 
Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205, 280 P.3d at 708. 
Thus, the holding in Tomlinson is directly in line with the applicable Idaho 
case law that holds the results of the alcohol concentration test, not the “actual” 
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alcohol concentration while driving, are determinative of liability under I.C. § 18-
8004.  It was well within the powers of the legislature to define the crime in this 
manner.  Contrary to Austin’s argument on appeal, Tomlinson was not wrongly 
decided, but was a correct application of applicable case law.   
 
D. Austin Does Not Have A Constitutional Due Process Right To Present 
Irrelevant Evidence 
 
Austin argues the district court’s exclusion of his extrapolation evidence 
denied his due process right to present a defense.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 
21-24.)  Austin’s due process argument relies upon a similar misunderstanding 
of Idaho Code § 18-8004 as his evidentiary argument.  Austin argues “I.C. § 18-
8004(1) makes it clear that one of the elements of the crime of driving under the 
influence is having an alcohol concentration over the limit while driving.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 21-22 (emphasis in original).)  As noted above, this is 
incorrect.   
Contrary to Austin’s argument on appeal, the plain language of the statute 
does not require a defendant to have a blood alcohol level of 0.08 “while” driving.  
Rather, under the plain language of the statute, a “per se” violation is occurs, not 
when the person drives, but when the “analysis of his blood, urine, or breath” is a 
0.08 or above.  The statute provides that it is “unlawful for any person … who 
has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, 
or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a 
highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public.”  
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I.C. 18-8004(1) (emphasis added).  Since it is impossible to analyze a driver’s 
blood, urine or breath before he or she is stopped and tested, it is clear the 
legislature intended the operative BAC to be the BAC at the time of the analysis, 
not the BAC while driving.   
Austin’s due process argument is based upon a different reading of I.C. § 
18-8004 than the one given to it in Elias-Cruz, Tomlinson, and Jones.  Under 
Idaho law interpreting I.C. § 18-8004, the extrapolation evidence is irrelevant.  
There is no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence.  State v. Marks, 
156 Idaho 559, 563, 328 P.3d 539, 543 (Ct. App. 2014) (constitutional right to 
present a defense does not “permit an accused to present irrelevant evidence”).  
The Supreme Court said as much in Elias-Cruz:  “There is no due process 
violation in excluding irrelevant evidence.  There is no constitutional right to drive 
with alcohol in one’s system.”  153 Idaho at 205, 280 P.3d at 708.  Austin’s 
interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-8004 is contrary to both the plain language of 
the statute and the Idaho appellate Courts’ repeated interpretation of it.  His 
proposed extrapolation evidence is irrelevant, and there is no constitutional right 
to present irrelevant evidence.   
 
II. 
Austin Has Failed To Establish It Was Fundamental Error For The District Court 
To Not Rule Idaho Code § 18-8004 Is Unconstitutional 
 
A. Introduction 
 For the first time on appeal Austin argues that Idaho Code § 18-8004 is 
void for vagueness and is unconstitutionally overbroad.  (See Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 24-34.)  Because these theories were not presented to the district court they 
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are reviewed for fundamental error on appeal.  Austin has failed to show it was 
fundamental error for the district court to not sua sponte rule I.C. § 18-8004 is 
unconstitutional.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de novo.  State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 
(2003).  The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome 
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the 
statute.  Id.  The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute 
that upholds its constitutionality.  Id. 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error By Not Sua Sponte 
Ruling I.C. § 18-8004 Unconstitutional  
 
 Austin did not move the district court to rule that I.C. § 18-8004 was void 
for vagueness or unconstitutionally overbroad.  On appeal, Austin concedes that 
“[t]his issue was not directly raised below.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 24.)  However, 
Austin argues that the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-8004 was preserved because 
the district court asked questions that “revealed its concern about vagueness in 
particular.”  (Id.)  Questions by the district court do not amount to Austin raising 
the issue that I.C. § 18-8004 was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.  These 
were not theories advanced by Austin before the district court.   
“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, 
and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to 
the lower court.”  State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, No. 44443, 2017 WL 2569786, at *3 
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(Idaho June 14, 2017) (citing Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, By & Through 
Dep’t of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799–800, 589 P.2d 540, 546–47 (1979); 
Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 119, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005); Frasier v. 
Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 82, 437 P.2d 32, 35 (1968)) (“We have held generally that 
this court will not review issues not presented in the trial court, and that parties 
will be held to the theory on which the cause was tried.”).  Austin did not advance 
a theory that I.C. 18-8004 was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad before the 
district court.  Nor was there a ruling by the district court regarding the 
constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-8004.  State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 557, 
224 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Ct. App. 2010) (“In order for an issue to be raised on 
appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling that forms the basis for the 
assignment of error.”) (citations omitted).  Therefore Austin is limited to arguing it 
was fundamental error for the district court to not sua sponte rule I.C. § 18-8004 
unconstitutional.   
Fundamental error is an error that “so profoundly distorts the trial that it 
produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to 
due process.”  State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992).  In 
order to constitute fundamental error the defendant must show that the error: “(1) 
violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly 
exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a 
tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.”  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 
245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).  Austin’s argument on appeal fails all three prongs.   
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1. Idaho Code § 18-8004 Does Not Violate Austin’s Unwaived 
Constitutional Rights 
 
 For the first time on appeal, Austin argues that Idaho Code § 18-8004, as 
interpreted by Tomlinson, violates his unwaived due process rights because it is 
void for vagueness and unconstitutionally overbroad.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 
24-34.)  Both of Austin’s arguments fail.  
 Austin’s arguments initially fail because Austin is not actually challenging 
the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-8004 itself.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 
27.)  Instead of arguing I.C. § 18-8004 is unconstitutional, Austin argues that the 
holding in Tomlinson makes I.C. § 18-8004 unconstitutional.  (See id. (“As an 
initial point, Mr. Austin does not argue that the statute is vague on its face 
because he asserts that the statute as written allows for a defendant to put on 
evidence of his alcohol concentration at the time of driving as it is clear that this 
is the prohibited conduct.  Under Tomlinson, however, such evidence is 
supposedly irrelevant.”).)  Austin’s argument is illogical.   
 If Austin concedes that I.C. § 18-8004 passes constitutional muster, and it 
is only Tomlinson that is unconstitutional, any constitutional issue is with 
Tomlinson – not I.C. § 18-8004.  Austin should therefore have argued that 
Tomlinson should be overruled, not that Idaho Code § 18-8004 is 
unconstitutional.3  Therefore, the basic premise of Austin’s argument fails and 
Austin has failed to meet the first prong of the fundamental error analysis.   
                                            
3 Presumably this is partially why Austin argued that Tomlinson was wrongly 
decided.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-20.)   
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a. Idaho Code § 18-8004 Is Not Void-For-Vagueness Because 
Ordinary People Can Understand What Conduct Is 
Prohibited 
 
 Even if Austin’s void-for-vagueness argument is considered, Idaho Code 
§ 18-8004 is not void-for-vagueness.  “[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires 
that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that 
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”  State v. Knutsen, 
158 Idaho 199, 202, 345 P.3d 989, 992 (2015) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).  “[T]he more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is 
not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the 
requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement.’”  Id. (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358).  “A criminal defendant 
that engages in conduct that is clearly proscribed by the statute cannot complain 
that it may be vague as applied to the conduct of others.”  Id. (quoting Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 19-20 (2010)). 
“A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute 
or regulation under which it is obtained ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it 
authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.’”  F.C.C. v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (quoting United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).  Thus, “the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary and discriminatory 
prosecutions.”  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010) (citing 
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Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357).  Statutes, however, have a “strong presumption” of 
validity and the court must, if it can, “construe, not condemn” them.  Id. at 402-
403 (internal quotes and citations omitted).  That “close cases can be 
envisioned” is insufficient to “render[] a statute vague” because the state must 
still prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Williams, 553 U.S. at 305-306.  
Even if a statute’s “outermost boundaries” are “imprecise,” such uncertainty has 
“little relevance” if the “appellant’s conduct falls squarely within the ‘hard core’ of 
the statute’s proscriptions.”  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973); 
see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412 (citing Broadrick).   
Austin argues that the statute, as interpreted by Tomlinson, “fails to give 
notice of what the prohibited conduct is because the test result is all that 
matters.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 33.)  And “in theory, the acts of driving and 
drinking could be days apart, but the prosecutor could still prosecute.”  (Id.)  
Austin’s argument fails.  The statute, as interpreted by case law, does not fail to 
provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.  Under 
the plain language of the statute, a “per se” violation occurs when a person 
drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle, in a place open to the 
public, and then provides a test result that shows an alcohol concentration of 
0.08 or more.  See I.C. 18-8004(1).  A person of ordinary intelligence has fair 
notice of what is prohibited.  Austin’s extreme hypotheticals of prosecutions 
based on breath tests administered days after driving does not render the statute 
void for vagueness.  Even if the outermost boundaries of the scope of I.C. § 18-
8004 are imprecise and close calls can be envisioned it does not render the 
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statute unconstitutional.  Further, Austin’s extreme hypotheticals have little 
relevance here, because Austin’s conduct falls squarely within the “hard core” of 
Idaho Code § 18-8004’s proscriptions.  See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 608.  “A 
criminal defendant that engages in conduct that is clearly proscribed by the 
statute cannot complain that it may be vague as applied to the conduct of 
others.”  Knutsen, 158 Idaho at 202, 345 P.3d at 992.  Austin has failed to show 
Idaho Code § 18-8004 is void-for-vagueness. 
 
b. Idaho Code § 18-8004 Is Not Overbroad Because It Does 
Not Regulate Any Constitutionally Protected Conduct 
 
Austin has also failed to show Idaho Code § 18-8004 is overbroad.  “The 
overbreadth doctrine is aimed at statutes which, though designed to prohibit 
legitimately regulated conduct, include within their prohibitions constitutionally 
protected freedoms.”  State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 423, 272 P.3d 382, 
395 (2012) (citing Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 133).  There is a two-
part test to determine whether a statute is overbroad:   
(1) whether the statute regulates constitutionally protected conduct, 
and  
(2) whether the statute precludes a significant amount of that 
constitutionally protected conduct. 
 
Id. (citing Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 133).  A statute is overbroad if 
both parts of the test are answered in the affirmative.  Id.  A statute is not 
overbroad “merely because it is possible to imagine some unconstitutional 
applications.”  Id. at 424, 272 P.3d at 396 (citing Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714, 69 
P.3d at 134).  “The overbreadth doctrine is ‘strong medicine,’ and courts employ 
 
 24 
it only as a last resort.”  Id. at 435, 272 P.3d at 407 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 
613).   
 Here, Austin has failed to show what constitutionally protected conduct is 
regulated by Idaho Code § 18-8004, and he has failed to show that Idaho Code  
§ 18-8004 precludes a significant amount of that constitutionally protected 
conduct.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-34.)  There is no constitutional right to 
drink and drive.  See Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205, 280 P.3d at 708.  Idaho Code 
§ 18-8004 is not overbroad and Austin has failed to establish the first prong of 
the fundamental error analysis.   
 2. The Error Is Not Clear From The Record 
Austin has failed to show that any error is clear from the record.  An error 
plainly exists if the error is clear from the record and there is not any need for 
additional information, including information as to whether the failure to object 
was a tactical decision.  See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  On 
appeal, Austin states “the error is clear from the record as the district court’s 
decision to grant the State’s motion was a violation of Mr. Austin’s due process 
rights because, under the dicta in Elias-Cruz and Tomlinson, the statute was 
rendered overbroad and void for vagueness as applied, and there was no 
indication that counsel did not explicitly raise the issue because of some 
strategic decision.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 25.)  Austin’s fails this prong of the 
fundamental error analysis for the same reason he failed the first prong, because 
there was no constitutional violation.  See supra § II(C)(1).  Even if there was 
error for the district court to not sua sponte rule I.C. § 18-8004 unconstitutional, 
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that error is certainly not clear from the record.  The minimal argument provided 
by Austin regarding “clear error” has failed to establish any error was clear from 
the record.   
 
 3. Austin Has Failed To Show Any Error Was Not Harmless Because 
 The State Presented An Alternate “Impairment” Theory To The 
 Jury In Addition To The “Per Se” Theory  
 
Austin has failed to show error.  Even if there was error, Austin has failed 
to show the error was not harmless.  In order to meet the third prong of the 
fundamental error analysis, “the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it 
must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 
226, 245 P.3d at 978.  Austin has failed to demonstrate that the error affected 
the outcome of the trial proceedings.   
 Austin dedicates one sentence to his harmless error argument.  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 25 (“And finally, violating Mr. Austin’s due process rights 
affected the outcome of the proceedings because it denied him the right to 
present a defense.”).)  Austin’s harmless error argument focuses solely on the 
“per se” portion of I.C. § 18-8004.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-34.)  Specifically 
that I.C. 18-8004, as interpreted by case law, is unconstitutional because 
extrapolation evidence is irrelevant.  (See id.)  However, at trial the state 
proceeded on both a “per se” theory of DUI and the “impairment” theory.  (See 
3/14/16 Tr., p. 30, Ls. 1-13; 3/15/16 Add. Tr., p. 207, L. 6 – p. 208, L. 5.)  Austin 
does not claim the outcome of the trial would have been different had he been 
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permitted to introduce extrapolation evidence in relation to the “per se” theory nor 
can he because there was substantial evidence that Austin drove while impaired.   
Austin crossed multiple traffic lanes without using his turn signal.  (3/14/16 
Tr., p. 37, L. 4 – p. 40, L. 6.)  When Deputy Richardson pulled Austin over he 
immediately smelled an odor of alcohol.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 41, Ls. 4-19.)  Austin’s 
eyes were “a little bloodshot and glassy” and his speech was “a little bit” slow.  
(Id.)  Austin admitted he had “one shot of alcohol.”  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 42, Ls. 9-19.)  
Austin failed field sobriety tests.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 45, L. 7 – p. 69, L. 22; R., pp. 
16-18.)  Austin admitted to Deputy Richardson that he knew he did not do well 
on the field sobriety tests.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 69, Ls. 10-22.)  The deputies had 
body cameras that recorded the interaction with Austin.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 70, L. 15 
– p. 75, L. 10; Exs. 1, 2.)  The state’s expert, Gary Dawson, reviewed the police 
reports and the police video, including the recording of the field sobriety tests, 
and testified Austin was “impaired beyond the ability to safely operate a motor 
vehicle.”  (3/15/16 Tr., p. 268, L. 25 – p. 271, L. 21.)  The district court offered to 
let Austin present his expert regarding the “impairment” theory, but Austin 
declined.  (3/14/16 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 4-12, p. 31, Ls. 7-13; 3/15/16 Tr., p. 144, Ls. 
18-19.)  Thus, the outcome of the trial would not have been different because 
Austin still would have been convicted under the impairment theory of DUI.  





 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Austin’s withheld 
judgment.  
 DATED this 28th day of June, 2017. 
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